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Book Reviews 
Liberty and Security,"by Conor Gearty, (Polity Press, 2013), 160pp., paperback, 
£50.00, ISBN: 978-0-7456-4718-0. 
No principle is more basic to our conception of justice than equality under law. Democracy is premised 
on the requirement that every person must have an equal say in governance--one person, one vote. The 
rule oflaw demands that all are equal before the law, even and especially those who exercise legal authority. 
And human rights are owed to all humans equally, regardless of race, religious, sex, or nationality. As 
Conor Gearty insists in Liberty and Security, the common thread that runs through our commitments to 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights is that liberty and security must be guaranteed for all, not 
reserved for the select few. 
Yet the common pattern that Gearty persuasively and trenchantly documents, in countries as diverse 
as Russia, the United Kingdom, Uganda, Australia, Turkey, and the United States, is that governments 
have selectively sacrificed the liberties of some for the security of others. The security of the powerful is 
most often purchased not by demanding that the powerful sacrifice their own liberties, but by restricting 
the liberty of the weak and vulnerable. 
This should not come as a surprise. It is exceedingly difficult to say which of one's own rights one 
would surrender for the possibility of greater security; we want both. Moreover, the costs of rights 
infringements and the benefits of security initiatives are notoriously impervious to measurement; and even 
if they could be measured, they are incommensurable. For a politician, it is so much easier to offer to 
strengthen the security of the majority or the powerful by surrendering the liberty of someone else. 
In the context of counter-terrorism, the focus of this important and engagingly argued book, those who 
bear the brunt of the sacrifices are, by and large, foreign nationals, and especially Arabs and Muslims. 
Thus, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Parliament enacted a law authorising the indefinite detention of 
foreign nationals who were suspected terrorists--even though when that law was challenged, the government 
was forced to admit that it faced terrorist threats from British nationals and foreigners alike. In the United 
States, thousands offoreign nationals, virtually all Arab or Muslim, were detained on immigration charges 
in anti-terrorism initiatives after the 9/11 attacks. Almost none of them were ever charged with a terrorist 
offence. Guantanamo, the CIA's secret prisons and the military commissions were all reserved for foreign 
nationals. The United Nations Security Council adopted a mechanism for blacklisting individuals and 
organisations without any procedural protections, and required all nations to freeze the assets of all on the 
list-a sanction that has been applied almost exclusively against Arabs and Muslims. These and many 
other counter-terrorism practices would likely be politically unacceptable if they applied equally to all; 
their viability turns on a double standard. 
To Gearty, this problem runs even deeper. He argues that democracies the world over-new and 
old-have largely abandoned their commitment to universalism, substituting instead at most a kind of 
formal equality that masks deeper underlying substantive inequalities. As he puts it: 
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"Increasingly societies have organized themselves as places of great (and rising) inequality with 
·nevertheless apparently strong commitments to democracy and human rights, supported by the 
impartial demand of a rule of law that claims to stand above politics as a guarantor of freedom. It is 
when no fair-minded observer not intent on fooling him- or herself can avoid the mismatch between 
the facts of inequality and the forms of freedom that we know we are living in a neo-democratic 
world: poverty on the rise; the emergence of super-rich classes; the elections always won by the same 
crew; the court judgments that go only one way; the human rights ethic that is applauded in the 
abstract and ignored on the streets; the external inspectors that change next to nothing."(29) 
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In Gearty's view, the problem is not just that society's privileged few have exploited double standards 
to avoid the hard choices posed by trade-offs between liberty and security, but that the liberties of capitalism 
cannot be reconciled with the demands of equality. At times, Gearty's argument nods toward socialist 
critiques of the free market, but he does not develop this interesting suggestion. In what ways are the 
double standards that pervade security initiatives, and which most often pivot on nationality, ethnicity or 
religion, linked to the class inequalities that a free market permits and often exacerbates? Gearty suggests 
that they are both endemic in "neo-democracies", but does not explore the link further. It might be that 
tolerance of economic inequality, so central to capitalism, makes us less sensitive to other sorts of 
inequalities. It may be that economic inequalities fuel the unrest and violence that then triggers repressive 
counter-measures. Or it might be that even in the most egalitarian of polities, national security measures 
would discriminate against outsiders. Gearty does not say, but his argument raises important questions 
about the interconnections of inequalities driven by economic and security impulses. 
Gearty is absolutely right to criticise the selective sacrifices of rights in the name of security, and to 
argue for "liberty and security for all". But his critique is at times too pessimistic, and his solution gets 
us only part of the way toward a just counter-terrorism policy. 
Gearty emphasises the troubling role that the United Nations and international law have played in 
inequitable and unjust counter-terrorism practices. Where international law once provided a basis for 
resisting unfair security initiatives as violations of human rights, Gearty contends that international law 
has become a facilitator of such violations. The United Nations Security Council in particular has in recent 
years, and especially since 9/11, adopted a series of resolutions requiring nation-states to adopt a range 
of counter-terrorism laws, including measures targeted at terror financing and incitement or glorification 
of terrorism. These resolutions, overseen by a UN bureaucracy designed to hold nations accountable if 
they do not target terrorism with sufficient enthusiasm, have provided a useful cover for regimes to justify 
the targeting and suppression of their opponents. Such exploitation of the counter-terrorism mandate is 
made easier, Gearty notes, by the failure even to reach a consensus on how to define terrorism, leaving 
the term vulnerable to selective attachment to one's enemies. 
But Gearty's diagnosis may be too pessimistic. There have also been key moments when international 
human rights norms have limited governments' ability to sacrifice the rights of the most vulnerable. The 
high-water mark of such resistance is the Law Lords' decision in the Belmarsh case, in which the Lords 
declared that the law authorising indefinite detention of foreign suspected terrorists was invalid precisely 
because it treated foreign nationals and British citizens differently. The court reasoned that as both native 
and foreign terrorists posed security threats, and as both foreigners and natives have an equal right to 
liberty, there could be no justification for selectively imposing indefmite detention only on foreign nationals. 
When Parliament had to apply restrictions on suspected terrorists to all, Gearty notes, its legislation 
stirred substantially more discussion and debate. In the end, Parliament dialled back the restrictions, first 
to "control orders", and more recently, to Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, or TPIMs, a 
sort of control order lite. International human rights also played a key role in improving the procedures 
due to persons subject to such restraints. The European Court of Human Rights, in reviewing the Belmarsh 
decision, declared that individuals subject to restraints on their liberty based on secret evidence must be 
given sufficient information about the charges and evidence against them to permit them to participate in 
their own defence and instruct their lawyers. 
European Convention rights also compelled Parliament to repeal a law that authorised the police to 
conduct suspicionless stops and frisks in designated geographical areas (such as, for many years, all of 
London). And the European Court of Justice has now twice invalidated, as contrary to the European 
Constitution's requirements of procedural fairness, terror-financing sanctions mandated by the UN Security 
Council. 
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Of course, the United Kingdom and Europe have each agreed to be bound by international rights 
standards directly enforceable by European institutions. But international human rights norms also played 
an important role in reining in the response of the United States to 9/11, despite that country's habitual 
resistance to international law limits, and President George W. Bush's best efforts to render international 
law altogether irrelevant to his "war on terror". The Bush administration argued that the Geneva Conventions 
did not apply to AI Qaeda detainees, but the US Supreme Court in 2005 ruled otherwise, declaring that 
Common Art.3 of the Geneva Conventions, which guarantees basic human rights for all detainees in 
wartime, applies to AI Qaeda. And when the Bush administration argued that the international prohibition 
on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in the Convention Against Torture, a multilateral treaty, did 
not protect foreign nationals held outside the United States, the US Congress enacted the McCain 
Amendment, which made clear that the prohibition applied to all detainees held by the United States, 
regardless of where they were located or what passport they held. 
More broadly, the US was in effect compelled to retreat from most of its troubling rights-infringing 
counter-terrorism measures by a combination of international and domestic criticism and resistance, often 
based on human right norms. Thus, by the time he had left office, President Bush had released over 500 
of the detainees he once held at Guantanamo Bay, transferred all detainees out of the CIA's secret prisons, 
stopped relying on renditions to third countries for coercive interrogations, placed his warrantless 
wiretapping programme under court supervision, reformed the military commission procedures and stopped 
authorising waterboarding. When President Obama came into office, he introduced still further reforrhs. 
He closed the CIA secret prisons altogether, successfully pushed for still further improvements in military 
commission procedures, released another 100 or so Guantanamo detainees, forbade reliance on "enhanced 
interrogation techniques" and disclosed many still-secret Justice Department memoranda and documents 
authorising coercive interrogation. 
Why would the most powerful country in the world, with unmatched military power, retreat on measures 
that were adopted to further its nationals' security largely at the expense of foreigners' rights? The best 
explanation, in my view, is the power of appeals to the rule oflaw, human rights and fundamental fairness, 
especially where those values are being pressed by an engaged and robust civil society. Groups like the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Reprieve, 
Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First consistently and strategically challenged the US efforts as 
contrary to fundamental principles of constitutional and international law. Individuals risked reprisals by 
disclosing secret programmes that they believed violated fundamental tenets of law, including the CIA's 
use of disappearance, torture, and cruel and inhuman treatment for interrogation. The press published the 
disclosures and editorialised against the lawbreaking. And those challenges fuelled criticism from America's 
friends and foes alike, and ultimately created sufficient pressure to compel the US to conform its actions 
more closely to legal norms. 
Thus, while Gearty is right to be concerned that nations too often pay only lip service to the universalist 
assumptions of human rights, while using the Security Council's counter-terrorism mandates to selectively 
undermine those rights, it is not necessarily the case that "neo-democracy" has prevailed. Without a doubt, 
serious rights deprivations persist-but then again, that has always been and is always likely to be the 
case. That's why we need commitments to human rights and the rule oflaw in the first place. But far from 
being a fig leaf for repression, human rights and the rule of law have been critically important tools in 
reining in counter-terrorism measures. 
Moreover, while Gearty's critiques of double standards are on the mark, even if we could eliminate all 
double standards, that would not satisfactorily answer the hard questions of how to balance liberty and 
security in the modem era. Technological advances have given small bands of people or even lone 
individuals the wherewithal to wreak widespread destruction, and simultaneously afforded governments 
the power to monitor more broadly and to target more narrowly and at greater distances than ever before. 
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These developments raise challenging questions, and the answers are not to be found only in the golden 
rule. 
Gearty is sharply critical, for example, of the absence of procedural protections afforded to those who 
are subject to civil sanctions for terror financing. As noted above, the European Court of Justice agrees 
with him that the procedures have been deficient. But Gearty is less clear about what procedures, short 
of a criminal trial, he would find satisfactory. Yet nothing in the concepts of universal human rights 
demands that civil economic sanctions be imposed only upon conviction in a criminal trial. Fair process 
is required, but criminal proceedings are not the only form of fair process. 
Similarly, Gearty is critical of preventive detention, both for investigatory purposes in the UK, and for 
preventive purposes in the context of the US's armed conflict withAl Qaeda and the Taliban. But all 
democracies have resorted to preventative detention under some circumstances-to hold suspects pending 
trial or deportation where they pose a risk of flight or of injuring others, to incapacitate the mentally 
incompetent who pose a danger to themselves or others, and to hold the enemy during wartime. It does 
not follow from the principle that liberty and security should be extended to all that such exercises of state 
power are illegal. 
The universalist demand of human rights also does not answer the question of when, if ever, targeted 
killing is appropriate against an enemy who is engaged in an armed conflict, operating beyond the traditional 
battlefield, with the intention and capacity to inflict significant damage on the nation and its people. It 
does not answer when, and under what circumstances, legitimate concerns about secrecy should be allowed 
to modify the principle of open justice by holding closed proceedings with cleared counsel. Nor does it 
answer what the appropriate limits are to surveillance in the modem digital age, when virtually everything 
we do creates a traceable and searchable footprint. Should security agencies be permitted to sweep up 
phone metadata across the board, without suspicion, if they commit to searching that data only when they 
actually develop individualised suspicion? What level of terrorist act triggers a nation's right to self-defence, 
and what level requires an ordinary law enforcement response? Where an armed conflict arises between 
a terrorist group and a nation-state, which rules should apply? 
These are all extraordinarily difficult questions. None of them is satisfactorily answered by proclaiming 
that human rights, the rule of law, and democracy demand that we treat everyone equally. Democracies 
that fully honour those principles might still deploy drones or detain the enemy during an armed conflict, 
engage in technologically aided surveillance, or use civil sanctions to freeze the assets of those who finance 
terror. The notion that the powerful should not sacrifice the rights of the vulnerable is critically important, 
but it takes us only so far. Gearty is right that when we fail to honour that principle, we will almost certainly 
strike an unjust and unwarranted balance between liberty and security. But recognition of the mandate of 
universalism is only the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. 
David Cole 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
